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Abstract Comments and reports on synthetic biology
often focus on the idea that this field may lead to syn-
thetic life or life forms. Such claims attract general
attention because Blife^ is a basic concept that is under-
stood, interpreted and explained in multiple ways. While
these different understandings of life may influence the
ethical assessment of synthetic biology by experts and
the public, this field might, in turn, influence how aca-
demics or the public view life. We suggest in this paper
that synthetic biology provides an opportunity to discuss
and compare different views and explanations of the
world, starting from the concept of life. We argue that a
narrow focus on just one interpretation of this concept
may be harmful and that people will benefit from being
aware of a diversity of understandings of life because
they provide answers to different questions. Moreover,
the confrontation among views is important for the de-
velopment of reasoning abilities, and a nuanced view on
ourworld will be useful for integrating scientific findings
and their implications into a wider context. At the same
time, we should not only consider other understandings
of life for our own benefit but also because a moral
attitude of respect for and toleration toward others im-
plies permission to express and maintain their views. For
these reasons, we suggest that a diversity of views on life
should be included in public education and in public
engagement events on synthetic biology. Moreover, they
should be on the research agenda of technology assess-
ment studies within the ELSA or RRI frameworks.
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Introduction
Synthetic Biology Provides One of Many Possible
Explanations of Life
The techno-science of synthetic biology is expected to
influence our future in various ways. As a technology, it
could lead to useful applications, for instance, in medi-
cine or the production of biofuels. As a science, synthet-
ic biology is expected to provide knowledge about
processes in living organisms, their modes of operation
and their origins. Synthetic biology may thus not only
influence everyday life through novel applications, but
it may also have an influence on how people perceive,
view, understand, and explain the world. Indeed, reports
on synthetic biology have already initiated discussions
on whether synthetic biology leads to synthetic life,
under what conditions life would be considered to be
synthetic or whether life can be synthetic in the first
place [10, 16, 24]. In this commentary, we are concerned
with these impacts; we will discuss how society should
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The concept of life aroundwhich everything revolves
in these debates is of a particular character. It is an
everyday concept used in the context of our own biog-
raphy as well as in the description of our environment.
However, it is also a key concept for certain philosoph-
ical disciplines (such as philosophy of life and phenom-
enology) and certain scientific theories with philosoph-
ical elements (theories of autopoiesis and biosemiotics).
Finally, it is the declared object of the life sciences,
which although usually not explicitly referring to life,
are said to investigate the scientific aspects of life. We
speak of different Bunderstandings^ of life in order to
refer to this variety. These understandings are based on
different worldviews. They refer to different theories
and models in order to explain life, and their explana-
tions focus on different aspects of life.1 Biologists, for
instance, usually focus on a list of functional or biolog-
ical criteria of living organisms [26]. In contrast, the
philosophical discipline of phenomenology is interested
in our perception and appreciation of life as a phenom-
enon [34] and the ethical position of biocentrism dis-
cusses the question of moral value in all living organ-
isms [1, 14]. In light of this diversity, one may wonder
whether it is justified to speak of one and the same
concept of life. We think this is justified; the reference
to the term life in the different understandings discussed
here is not a simple equivocation. Representatives of the
different views on life mostly agree onwhich entities are
alive.2 Because these positions focus on different as-
pects and questions concerning the same subject, the
majority of understandings of life are compatible. A
scientific explanation concerning the functioning of the
processes in living organisms is compatible with a phe-
nomenological explanation about the appearance of liv-
ing organisms and our perception of them. Even reli-
gious understandings of life as a gift from God are
compatible with biological explanations of living
organisms. If, however, a position explicitly dismisses
background assumptions of another position, this leads
to mutually exclusive explanations, for instance, if cre-
ationists deny evolution or a reductionist scientist denies
the possibility of a supernatural being.
More than researchers in most other types of biology,
synthetic biologists like to emphasize that they wish to
contribute to the understanding of life [15]. In many
commentaries on synthetic biology, the authors point
out that this field will change how we see life. Craig
Venter, for instance, famously commented that his find-
ings were an important step, scientifically and philo-
sophically, that had changed his view not only on how
life works but also on how it is to be defined [35]. The
claims of synthetic biology could thus influence nonsci-
entific views on life. Even in the field’s early days, the
authors of a commentary article noted that one should
consider the questions of Bhow work on minimal ge-
nomes and the creation of new free-living organisms
change how we frame ideas of life and our relationship
to it^ [8]. Other commentators suggested that synthetic
biology does, or will in the future, show that there is no
Bmystery^ in life or that it will end the debate about the
nature of life [6]. According to these authors, synthetic
biology can show that nonscientific approaches to
explaining life are wrong or useless.
The aim of this article is neither to criticize the
understanding of life in synthetic biology nor to ques-
tion its validity or importance. We suggest that scientific
explanations of life, and the new turn synthetic biology
gives these views, ought to be integrated into a wider
context. We attempt to show here that it is impor-
tant to consider and propagate at least some other
understandings of life instead of dismissing them
as Bnonscientific.^
We will argue that different understandings of life
should be propagated, because people can gain from a
variety of views. Nonbiological views on life can, for
instance, allow individuals to address questions that
science cannot address. Moreover, it is of educational
value to be confronted with a variety of different views.
The restriction to one narrow view on the world may be
harmful because important aspects may be overlooked.
In addition, a respectful and tolerant attitude toward
others requires giving them the opportunity to both be
confronted with multiple views on the world and to hold
and express their own views and interpretations.We will
argue that this applies even if some of these views may
be less well founded than others or if they are based on
1 We do not refer to the discrepancy in different understandings of
life, which have to dowith the fact that some positions speak of life
as the property, activity, or phenomenon that is shared by all living
organisms whereas others speak of life in a biographical sense as
the life-history of a self-conscious being. We are only concerned
here with positions that speak of life in the first sense. A special
issue of the journal Worldview 17 [16, 34] introduces a set of
different understandings of life in that sense and discusses how
they influence the assessment of synthetic biology.
2 Exceptions to this general Bagreement^ include entities, such as
viruses, erythrocytes, or spermatozoa, for which there are different
opinions on whether they should count as Balive.^
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religious beliefs, which many do not share. On this
basis, we will suggest that the diversity of views on
and explanations of life ought to be considered in public
engagement and education efforts and in the research
agenda of synthetic biology Ethical Legal and Social
Aspects (ELSA)3 projects.4 Finally, we raise the concern
that the transition from ELSA to Responsible Research
and Innovation (RRI) may run the risk of complicating
the inclusion of different worldviews into research on
societal, ethical, and philosophical implications of syn-
thetic biology or other biotechnologies.
Basic Concepts Have Been Important in the Debate
About Genetically Modified Organisms
The influence of synthetic biology on the understanding
of life presents only one side of the relation between the
basic concept of life and biotechnologies. It is not only
the technologies that influence how we see life but also
existing views on life that may influence how a technol-
ogy is assessed. Using the example of agricultural bio-
technology, we briefly illustrate in the following that
underlying understandings of basic concepts are rele-
vant in debates about emerging technologies.
The so-called genetic modification (GM) debate has
been dominated by concerns about potential risks and
benefits of GM organisms to the environment, human
health, economy, and society. Besides, as well as togeth-
er with, these risk-related issues, concerns about the
potential violation of the intrinsic value of modified
organisms [3, 37] and the unnaturalness of GM have
often been expressed by the public [20, 39]. Among
academics and other experts too, these issues have
caused controversy [22]. Concerns about an intrinsic
value of living organisms and the unnaturalness of this
technology express specific understandings of the basic
concepts of life and nature.
The idea that living organisms have an intrinsic value
that may be infringed upon by GM implies that living
organisms, unlike other Bthings,^ have moral standing.
Some proponents of this view explicitly worry that GM
may lead to conceptual reductionism (cf. [11, 27]) or
genetic determinism (cf. [4]). Concerns about reduction-
ism represent a fundamental critique of the materialistic
worldview and of the treatment of living organisms only
as a means to the end. Such critiques have been brought
forward by experts in the academic debate [22] as well
as by laypersons in the public debate about agricultural
biotechnology [20].
The other basic concept that has played an important
role in this debate is that of nature. Concerns about the
unnaturalness of GM are frequently brought forward to
show that gene technology is morally unacceptable, for
instance, because it is against the “autonomy of nature”
[25], contrary to a given “natural order” [30] or a con-
tradiction to the “natural aim” of nature [29]. In the 2002
Eurobarometer survey, 58 % of participants felt that
modern biotechnology has upset the balance of nature
and 65% felt that GM food threatens the natural order of
things [20]. Concerns about naturalness are based on
certain understandings of nature, which imply, for in-
stance, a desire for a world untouched by humans [18].
As a biotechnology that explicitly aims to produce
new life forms instrumental to human purposes, it can be
expected that many of these concerns will also be raised
in the context of synthetic biology. This debate will be
shaped and driven by novel circumstances, such as the
novel technical possibilities and increased Bdepth of
intervention^ associated with this field. However, not
only the technological background differs but so too do
new envisaged applications, a different historical con-
text, current discussions of environmental issues and a
novel view on technology driven by digital technology.
Finally, the very conclusions and experiences that all
sides have drawn from the GM debate provide an en-
tirely different background for the discussions on syn-
thetic biology.
Benefiting from Different Approaches to Explaining
Life
The clash of different understandings of basic concepts,
such as life and nature, in the GM debate is generally
considered objectionable and unwanted. This judgment
makes sense with respect to the emotional outbursts and
mutual lack of understanding that have characterized
this debate. However, with respect to the basic questions
of what we mean by life or nature an exchange of views
3 American authors often use the acronym Ethical Legal and
Social Implications/Issues (ELSI) for the same type of research.
Since the first ELSA/ELSI research program of the human genome
program has been launched, many developments of emerging
technologies, particularly in the life sciences, have been accompa-
nied by ELSA research programs.
4 In that sense, we support a point made by Philip Ball in an earlier
article in this journal, namely, that we need to know more about
different preconceptions and images of life and nature in order to
be able to understand the public discourse on synthetic biology [2].
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can be regarded as desirable. In this section, we establish
three reasons why a diversity of well-founded ap-
proaches to explain life is important and worthwhile.
Science Cannot Address All Questions About Life
When synthetic biologists explain why they can con-
tribute to the understanding of life, they like to quote the
saying that is ascribed to Richard Feynman: Bwhat I
cannot create I do not understand^ [7, 38]. Along these
lines, synthetic biology can indeed provide interesting
insight into how living organisms operate, about the role
of central biochemical components and the functioning
of the metabolism or regulatory mechanisms. However,
there are other questions about life: is there value or
meaning in life, and if so, what is this value or meaning
and where does it come from? Such questions are, for
instance, systematically addressed by ethics and philos-
ophy in general. These fields deal with aspects of life,
such as value or meaning, that are not covered by
science and that cannot be investigated using scientific
methods [17]. As indicated above, philosophical and
scientific explanations usually do not exclude each oth-
er; most philosophers consider scientific findings in
their theories about life. In that sense, synthetic biology
may inform philosophy, but it cannot replace philoso-
phy. Questions about value or meaning in life have
occupied humans for several thousand years. For a
comprehensive understanding of life, it is important to
get to know different approaches to explaining life.
At first sight, this plea for a diversity of understand-
ings of life may sound like an appeal to relativism,
according to which all the possible views on life are
equally true. However, to argue that the diversity of
understandings of life should be acknowledged is not
to say that any notion about life should be taken equally
seriously. Instead, it means that each explanation of life
should be compared with other explanations that ad-
dress the same type of questions and that it should be
assessed within its own theoretical and methodological
framework. This is to say that, for instance, vitalist
claims about a nonphysicochemical force, which is said
to be responsible for biological processes, can be refuted
by sciences such as synthetic biology. In contrast, phe-
nomenological claims about how we perceive and inter-
pret living organisms and about the significance of the
phenomenon or concept of life for humans cannot be
approached or assessed by scientific methodology; in-
stead, such claims need to be justified or criticized using
philosophical arguments [17]. In philosophy, this will
often not result in an outright rejection and disappear-
ance of a position but in a controversial discussion, in
which arguments for and against a position are brought
forward. If a position receives thorough attention and
acceptance by philosophical experts and brings up ele-
ments that may be interesting and relevant for a general
understanding of life in the public, such a view should
be introduced to the public. A well-known example,
which also brings us back to the point that science
cannot address all questions about life, is the position
of biocentrism [1, 14]. As discussed in the context of the
GM debate, many people have the intuition that living
things should be treated differently from nonliving mat-
ter. To hear how philosophers argue for and against an
intrinsic value to living beings will result in better
founded views on the value of life, an aspect of life that
cannot be addressed by science.
Techno-Scientific Expertise Imperialism Should
Be Avoided
Pivotal achievements of modern Western societies such
as the development of medicine and technology are
based on modern science. It is thus unsurprising that in
these societies, scientific approaches to explaining the
world are predominant. If uncertainties arise, natural
scientists are called in as experts. It is often overlooked
that some of the questions on core concepts such as life
are actually not scientific questions, and natural scien-
tists are not the competent experts. Alan Buchanan’s
phrase Bexpertise imperialism^ may be applied here.
He used this phrase to refer to a tendency to exaggerate
the domain of physicians’ expertise. He explained that
whereas physicians are indeed experts with respect to
the medical details of a patient’s illness, they are not
experts on what it means for a specific patient to lead a
good life. Appealing to their expertise in one field they
often act as, or are considered to be, experts also in the
other [5]. If synthetic biologists are perceived and act as
the only experts with respect to explanations of life, their
expertise in science is unwarrantedly extended to other
fields to which it does not apply such as philosophy.
One could thus speak of a type of Btechno-scientific
expertise imperialism^. Purely scientific approaches to
explaining life and the world may result in narrow-
minded doctrines, which may lead to problematic mor-
ally relevant beliefs. The understanding of living organ-
isms as machines, for instance, might make people
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overlook that animals can suffer. A one-sided view on
life and on the world in general could thus have the
effect that relevant philosophical or moral aspects are
disregarded.
The Confrontation with Other Approaches
to Explaining the World Is of Educational Value
In the two preceding sections, we established that a
diversity of understandings of life ought to be supported,
because this allows us to address a broader range of
questions and avoids expertise imperialism and the dis-
regard of important aspects. These points have in com-
mon that they call for different explanations of life,
because by collecting the information provided by the
different fields, we know more. In that sense, there is
educational value to a diversity of explanations of life
because one aim of education is to increase knowledge,
but the diversity of explanations of life also has educa-
tional value for other reasons. Different views on life
express different values and different interpretations. As
the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill
famously elaborated in his essay BOn Liberty,^ the
confrontation with such differences encourages the
questioning of one’s own views and the identification
of underlying reasons, interpretations, and values that
might be relevant to one’s view [31]. This may raise
novel ideas and help to sharpen one’s argumentation and
to put it into a wider perspective. In that sense, one may
also gain from, for instance, religiously inspired views,
which one might consider to be false, because one does
not share the underlying beliefs. In the humanities, the
awareness of multiple interpretations and the ability to
justify and confine one’s own argumentation are indis-
pensable for good academic practice. Nevertheless, such
a confrontation with other views also ought to be part of
general education, because everybody benefits from a
wider and more nuanced view.5
To be confronted with other approaches is thus per-
sonally enriching and a precondition for developing
reasoning abilities. It has even been suggested that rea-
soning is one of six core dimensions of well-being,
which have to be secured in a socially just system. In
such a system, it is necessary to give people the oppor-
tunity to develop their reasoning abilities ([33]: 19).
Therefore, education should not only provide
information but also train students how to deal with
different types of information. To discuss and examine
how different explanations of life relate to each other,
what arguments in the synthetic biology debate are
based on which understanding of life, why some of
these views are for some people more convincing than
others and where there are overlaps, could serve as a
prime example of how to develop and cultivate reason-
ing abilities.
Moral Attitudes Toward Those Holding Other Views
on Life
We have explained why a society and its members can
benefit from a diversity of views on and interpretations
of life and why a restricted view may be harmful. In the
following, we will not focus on potential consequences
of a narrow view but instead attempt to capture what
constitutes a respectful and tolerant attitude toward
those who hold views on life different from one’s own.
For many, purely biological descriptions of life—al-
though mainstream in many contexts in modern socie-
ties—are not exhaustive. We point out here that the
implementation of important moral principles such as
respect, toleration, and the right to freedom of opinion
and expression requires allowing holders of multiple
views on life to maintain, express, discuss, and propa-
gate their views. This proposition may seem to be evi-
dent to some readers, but in various discussions with
others, we have realized that there is a risk that
Btolerating different views^ is equated with relativism
or equal support for all views. In this section, we want to
explain why this equalization is not correct.
Respecting Personal Autonomy Includes Providing
Access to Different Types of Information
Respect for other people is a basic moral attitude that is
expected of each member of democratic societies be-
cause being respected is important for human well-be-
ing. Respect6 is due to each human being and includes
regarding and treating him or her as a source of moral
worth and dignity ([33]: 22). To be respected in this
5 Anthony Kronman made a similar point in the context of racial
and ethnic diversity in education in the USA: ([28]:. 875)
6 Stephen Darwall distinguishes between recognition respect,
which is owed to all people and appraisal respect which is granted
to appraise specific merits and of which thus not everybody is
equally worthy [12]. In our context, we focus on recognition
respect.
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sense means for persons to be able to act according to
their own motives and reasons. Therefore, respecting
persons includes respecting their autonomy.7 In bioeth-
ics, respecting autonomy is a central principle, which is
famously explained in the Belmont report:
BTo respect autonomy is to give weight to auton-
omous persons’ considered opinions and choices
while refraining from obstructing their actions
unless they are clearly detrimental to others. To
show a lack of respect for an autonomous agent is
to repudiate that person’s considered judgments,
to deny an individual the freedom to act on those
considered judgments, or to withhold information
necessary to make a considered judgment, when
there are no compelling reasons to do so.^ ([40]:
5)
This statement was made with regard to the medical
context and has led to a particular emphasis on the
importance of informed consent. Autonomy can, how-
ever, also be transferred to our context—how to deal
with different explanations of the central concept of
life in the synthetic biology debate. The quotation
states that to be autonomous means to be exposed to
all the information that is needed to make considered
judgments. In the medical context, this remark is
mostly related to factual information about the disease
and potential treatments. However, information that is
required to form considered judgments not only in-
cludes facts necessary to make informed medical de-
cisions but also background information required for
the development of a nuanced personal position. To be
autonomous thus implies being exposed to different
perspectives. Thomas Scanlon elaborates a political
version of this understanding of autonomy in his the-
ory of freedom of expression. He maintains that a state
is never entitled to repress freedom of expression on
the grounds that false beliefs would be propagated and
that people might cause harmful consequences in act-
ing upon these false beliefs. Scanlon claims that agents
are only autonomous if they have the option to com-
pare different arguments and judge for themselves
which they consider being false and which should be
action-guiding for them. Furthermore, he argues that
agents must be allowed to act upon their personal
beliefs, even if consequences are harmful [36].
Applied to our context, empowering persons to make
use of their autonomy means to confront them with
different views on life. This will allow them to develop
a personal understanding and interpretation of this
concept, which can serve as a basis for opinions on
synthetic biology and its applications.
Toleration and Freedom of Opinion and Expression
Imply Giving Those Who Hold Other Views a Voice
Toleration too is often understood as a concern for
autonomy of others [19]. When we examined the rele-
vance of respect for autonomy, however, we focused on
the importance of guaranteeing access to a broad variety
of information to allow people to form their own views,
opinions, and judgments. When we address the attitude
of tolerance and the right to freedom of opinion and
expression here, we assert that in democratic societies, it
is important that people can maintain and express their
views, even if many others do not share them.
Warranting the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion is part of a tolerant attitude. We understand toler-
ance as an attitude towards people rather than toward the
content of their opinions [23], but what does it mean to
pay attention to others in the discussion on life in syn-
thetic biology? It has been suggested that freedom of
expression implies that everybody ought to have access
to expressive opportunities [9]. To warrant expressive
opportunities for those who hold different views on life
in the debate about synthetic biology means that plat-
forms should be provided that allow for the expression
of different views, for instance, in public engagement
events or in the media.
Although toleration for others is not based on the
requirement that their views are convincing or accessi-
ble for us, it does not imply that all of these views need
to be treated equally. There are views, which although
tolerated as views of individuals, will not be considered
enriching or important. Examples of such views are
views that rest on faulty argumentation or are incompat-
ible with basic norms andmoral standards of democratic
societies such as human rights. For instance, a eugenic
theory about human life distinguishes betweenmore and
less desirable biological forms of human life. Such a
view can be interpreted as suggesting that humans
7 Because we are discussing what it means to act respectfully of
others in the context of different understandings of life, we focus
on respect for autonomous persons. This is not to say that human
beings who are no persons (such as young children) ought not to
be respected, but respecting them does not imply warranting that
they can maintain, express and propagate their specific views on
and interpretations of life.
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should be treated differently according to their biologi-
cal properties. This is not compatible with the principle
of equal rights for all human beings. There are strong
moral reasons not to support such a view beyond toler-
ating it as a problematic opinion of certain individuals
who do have freedom of opinion and expression.8
Warranting a right to freedom of opinion and expression
and practicing toleration is thus compatible with criti-
cizing and rejecting certain understandings of life and
does not force us into relativism.
Different Understandings of Life in the Debate
About Synthetic Biology
In the two previous chapters, we argued that the consid-
eration of and confrontation with other views is of great
importance. The discussion on synthetic biology sug-
gests itself to implement these conclusions, because
with the questions on synthetic life it raises issues that
are directly linked to different disciplines and world-
views. In the following, we describe three different
strategies for implementation.
First, efforts to inform and train the public ought to
include a discussion of different approaches to
explaining the world and the relation between these
explanations. We have argued that people gain in vari-
ous ways from being aware of and confronted with
different approaches to explaining life. Furthermore,
we have suggested that respecting the autonomy of
others means that one ought to facilitate their access to
the information that is necessary for forming nuanced
views on central concepts such as the concept of life. To
have such a view will help integrate the aims and claims
of synthetic biologists into a wider context and assist us
to judge whether, or in what respect, synthetic biology
leads to the engineering or synthesis of life.
A general understanding of the differences in interpre-
tations of the concept of life could also support people in
dealing with different associations that this concept may
have for them. The understanding that different explana-
tions of life may each be well-founded expert views, and
that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, will help
to bring these different associations together. Therefore,
public education efforts and media reports should not
present natural scientists as the only experts on life.
Instead, educationalists and the media also ought to con-
sult philosophers, ethicists, social scientists, theologians,
and other experts dealing with the concept of life in order
to foster the awareness of the diversity of this concept in
the public’s views.
Second, public engagement ought to include possibil-
ities for a mutual exchange of views on important con-
cepts, such as the concept of life, which influence the
perception of synthetic biology. Following the GM de-
bate, natural scientists and policy makers became aware
of the necessity to foster the interaction between natural
scientists and other members of society. The early Bpublic
understanding of science movement^ was based on the
idea that the main reason for public opposition to science
was the public’s lack of knowledge about science. This
Bdeficit model^ was then criticized by social scientists.
They argued that public education efforts should be re-
placed by mutual engagement efforts, in which natural
scientists listen to the public and where the public’s view
points, values, and concerns are taken up into the discus-
sion [13, 44]. We do not think that public engagement
ought to replacemore classical forms of public education,
where experts are involved as teachers. Instead, we think
the aims and justifications of public engagement differ
from those of public education and these should be seen
as complementary approaches.
We suggested that a tolerant moral attitude toward
our fellow humans implies allowing them to hold and
express their views, even if some of us consider those
views to be wrong. Scientists are part of society and are
influenced by the rest of society; in turn, their work
influences views in the rest of society. Scientific views
ought thus to be treated as one type among other types of
views—with a certain methodological approach to ex-
plain natural phenomena.9 In order to integrate a new
techno-science (such as synthetic biology) with society,
it is important that an exchange between natural
8 When we speak of tolerating expressions of a proponent of a
eugenic theory, this does not include political statements or dis-
criminatory hate speech that directly violates human dignity of
others. We exclusively speak of people who support eugenics as a
scientific principle as it was supported by well-known scientists in
the 1960s and 1970s, for instance some of the views expressed at
the CIBA Symposium BMan and His Future^ 1962 [43].
9 Joanna Goven revealed that this important point has been
disregarded in New Zealand’s Report of the Royal Commission
on Genetic Modification. In this report, the commission identified
worldviews as the sources of people’s values. They mention the
traditional Maori worldview, the ecological worldview and the
religious worldview but do not take into account that also the rest
of society, including scientists themselves, are influenced by a
specific worldview with its values [21].
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scientists and the rest of society takes place. The aim of a
mutual engagement process, as suggested here is not to
diminish the impact of synthetic biology but to reflect it
from different sides.
Third, research on ethical, legal, and social aspects
(ELSA) of synthetic biology ought to address the impli-
cations that synthetic biology has on the public’s views
about life and discuss the role of underlying understand-
ings of life for the perception and assessment of syn-
thetic biology. The impact of synthetic biology on the
public’s views about life is part of the ethical and social
aspects and implications of this field; it should thus be
addressed by ELSA research. The role of underlying
basic concepts in the GM debate indicates that different
understandings of nature or life do play a role in such
discussions. More information is needed about the un-
derstanding of such basic concepts by the public, of how
technological developments influence these concepts
and how, in turn, underlying basic concepts may influ-
ence the perception of and reaction to synthetic biology
and other emerging technologies. Importantly, this rela-
tionship between science and technology, on the one
hand, and the worldview and values in society, on the
other hand, should also remain on the research agenda
after the recent shift in the focus of technology assess-
ment from ELSA to RRI. RRI has been a reoccurring
phrase in the EU funding initiative Horizon 2020 and
also in documents of national research councils for
instance in the UK, Norway, and the Netherlands [42].
As indicated by the new label BRRI^ the focus lies in the
scientific innovation process. The idea is that technolo-
gy assessment institutions should not only focus on the
minimization of risks and negative impacts but also
direct the research development process toward aims
that take up needs and requests of society under consid-
eration of its central values [32, 42, 45]. Public engage-
ment and participatory approaches are a central element
of the RRI strategy; this should warrant the consider-
ation of different points of view. However, with this
focus on the innovation process and desired aims, we
may risk exclusion of other ethical and societal aspects
such as those discussed in this commentary. The respon-
sibility of natural scientists, those who communicate
about scientific developments and those who decide,
which positions should be represented in public events,
goes beyond the consideration of potential risks and the
steering of research and innovation towards socially
desirable applications. As pointed out here, this respon-
sibility includes modesty with respect to the explanatory
limits of scientific approaches and an effort to discuss
the implications that scientific findings and technologi-
cal developments have on the understanding that people
hold of the world and of themselves.
Concluding Remarks
Synthetic biology has so far not triggered strong public
opposition and may not do so in the near future [41].
However, as our rationale for communicating and
supporting a diversity of views on and explanations of
life infers, the aim of avoiding a backlash against syn-
thetic biology should neither be the only nor the main
reason for addressing ethical, philosophical, and societal
implications of this field or involving the public in these
discussions. Nevertheless, the observation that the pub-
lic currently seems not to be particularly worried about
synthetic biology may well shape public engagement
and education efforts and ELSA or RRI research. The
focus should not only be set on risks and benefits of
this technology and on informing the public about
the scientific background of synthetic biology.
Instead, we have argued here that this field might
also provide a valuable opportunity to deliberate on
different understandings and interpretations of the
central concept of life.
A variety of understandings of life provides a
remarkable opportunity for enriching the debate
about synthetic biology, because all participants
in this debate may gain from this diversity in
various ways. Moreover, such a debate provides
an opportunity to practice moral attitudes, such as
respect and tolerance, which are central to a dem-
ocratic society. An exchange and comparison of
different views on life may give the debate about
synthetic biology a special meaning and impor-
tance that goes beyond preventing conflict or cre-
ating acceptance.
This commentary focused on different views on
and explanations of the central concept of life in
the debate about synthetic biology. The point that
we wanted to make, however, is much more gen-
eral. It concerns the importance of different ap-
proaches to explaining basic concepts guiding our
understanding of the world such as Bnature,^
Bartificiality,^ Bnormality,^ Benvironment,^ or
Bhealth.^ This point is not only important in dis-
cussions on synthetic biology but also in other
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debates on issues that raise fundamental questions
about our understanding of the world in which we
live.
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